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Several of the new product in high-tech industries have been
introduced by entering ﬁrms, even though most of the technology
used to produce these new products was developed by incumbent
ﬁrms. This suggests that even though incumbent ﬁrms may have
an advantage in developing new technology, the opportunity cost
of switching from producing an old product to a new product
is high enough to prevent the switch. Jovanovic and Nyarko
(1996) suggest that one reason why leaders may tend to be slow to
adopt new technologies: an opportunity cost of switching. This
paper will extend the Jovanovic and Nyarko model to include
multiple agents in a dynamic setting where agents can invest in
learning. By structurally estimating this model using data from
the hard drive industry, the lock-in eﬀect of old technology can
be quantiﬁed and its importance can be determined.
11 Introduction
Several of the new products in high-tech industries have been introduced
by entering ﬁrms. In fact, most of these technologies used to produce
the new product were developed by incumbent ﬁrms. In the hard drive
industry, new diameters in the period 1977-1997 were ﬁrst brought to
the market by spin-outs, ﬁrms whose founders were formerly employed
at one of the incumbent ﬁrms within the industry (see Franco and Fil-
son (1999), and Christensen (1993)). This suggests that even though
incumbent ﬁrms may have an advantage in developing new products
and the technology used to produce these new products, the opportu-
nity cost of switching from producing an old product to a new product
is high enough to prevent the switch. As suggested in Irwin and Klenow
(1994), the mechanism by which spillovers occur must ﬁrst be identiﬁed
and understood in order to make clear policy conclusions. In this case,
there is evidence that employee mobility is important for sustainable
growth.
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) suggest one reason why leaders may
tend to be slow to adopt new technologies: an opportunity cost of switch-
ing. In their model, an agent improves his knowledge of a technology by
using it to produce output. The improvements in the agent’s knowledge
correspond to eﬃciencies in production. Each technology has bounded
productivity, so in order to continue production growth, the agent must
continually switch to newer technologies. However, there is a cost to
switching. An agent who switches to a new technology will not be as
eﬀective in operating it as in operating the old technology. Since the
switch is costly because of a loss of expertise, an agent may choose to
forestall switching technologies.
This paper will extend the Jovanovic and Nyarko model to include
multiple agents in a dynamic competitive industry setting where agents
can invest in learning. Though this is similar to Franco (1999) where
the main focus was incremental change in technology, this model will
include radical change as well. Christensen (1997) discusses the some of
the diﬀerences in the eﬀects of incremental changes and radical changes
in the hard drive industry. He views the radical changes as producing
signiﬁcantly more important changes in the distribution of the ﬁrms
within the industry. This paper will help to document these eﬀects and
quantify their magnitudes.
In the model, agents who operate ﬁrms will optimize over the choice
of technology to produce and investment research. Each technology
is used to produce a diﬀerent product. Firms can hire researchers to
improve their knowledge of the currently used technology and develop
new technologies. Research is unfocused, so ﬁrms can not preclude re-
2searchers from developing new technologies and force them to focus on
improving the current technology. Once learning has occurred, ﬁrms
must decide whether or not to continue operating and if they do, whether
or not to use the new technology or continue using the old technology.
Researchers can with some probability imitate their employer’s current
technology or learn a new technology, depending on their employer’s re-
search outcomes. These agents will then decide whether or not to operate
a ﬁrm using this technology or work as a researcher or an production
worker in the following period. The knowledge of an agent who works as
a production worker will remain unchanged. There are no adjustment
costs from switching to a new technology.. The main reason that a ﬁrm
would rather continue using an older technology is that its productivity
is higher.
The evolution of the technologies and knowledge of the industry will
evolve given the optimal choices by agents and can be completely charac-
terized given initial conditions. Using data from the hard drive industry
that includes product features, prices, quantities shipped, and ﬁrm ge-
nealogy, I will structurally estimate this model to test whether the issues
posed in Jovanovic and Nyarko are quantitatively important as well as
being qualitatively important. This will help to increase our understand-
ing of why leaders may be unwilling to adopt new technologies and may
have policy implications.
1.1 The Model
The model is set in a discrete time, infinite horizon environment. There
is a continuum of ex ante homogeneous, infinitely lived agents in the
industry. There are I products that can be produced by this industry.
Each of these products can be produced by using a distinct technology
associated with the product. Developing a new technology is the same as
developing a new product and is viewed as a radical improvement. Sup-
ply is aﬀected only by firms developing new technologies, which creates
a new product, and increasing their own knowledge over a given tech-
nology, which lowers production costs. Improving in knowledge about
a particular technology are considered to be incremental improvements.
The demand for a product is given by D(Qn,Q −n), an inverse industry
demand function, where Qn is the quantity of product n produced at
time t and Q−n is vector of the quantities of all other products produced
by this industry. This speciﬁcation is ﬂexible enough to allow products
to be substitutes or compliments. D is downward sloping Qn and con-
tinuous in both Qn and Q−n. There are no demand shocks, for ease of
3analysis.1 The agents’ discount factor is constant over time.
The timing of the model is as follows. At date t, agents know the
distribution of the technology and know-how pairs across the industry.
T h i si sg i v e nb yν t( I,Θ) where the distribution of know-how over a
particular technology n is νn. Technological know-how is indexed by
θ which is an element of the set Θ=[ θ L ,θ H]. Given this, agents de-
cide whether to work as production workers, or researchers or operate a
ﬁrm. Agents who work as production workers receive a wage, W 0, and
their technology and know-how pairs are unchanged from the previous
period. Agents who work as researchers for ﬁrms within the industry
receive a wage that depends, in equilibrium, on the ﬁrm’s technology
and know-how pair and how many researchers the ﬁrm employed. This
is due to the fact that researchers can, with probability λ, learn their
employer’s current technology and know-how pair and, with some prob-
ability determined by how many researchers the ﬁrm hires, learn a new
technology that was developed by the ﬁrm. In equilibrium, it is assumed
that an agent will only work for ﬁrms that have either higher know-how
about the same technology as the agent possessed or knowledge about
a diﬀerent technology, as yet unknown to the agent. Researchers can
become entrepreneurs by leaving the firm without aﬀecting the firm’s
viability: firms can produce output without researchers. Firms can only
produce one product at a time. Agents who run ﬁrms must maximize
proﬁts given a cost function and innovation costs which are the cost of
hiring researchers.
First, consider the case of an agent who chooses to work as a produc-
tion worker. This agent receives a ﬁxed wage given by W 0. It is assumed
that the outside option is ﬁxed by the rest of the economy. The human
capital of such an agent remains unchanged. In equilibrium, it can be
shown, as in Franco and Filson (1999) that any agent who chose to work
outside in the previous period will not operate a ﬁrm in the current
period.
The other option is to work as a researcher. In equilibrium, a re-
searcher’s wage depends only on her employer’s current technology and
knowledge pair and her employer’s learning expenditure. This is because
her expected future value is a convex function of her employer’s current
technology and knowledge pair, which she may learn with probability
λ, and the expected possibility of her employer learning a new technol-
ogy which is dependent on how much learning eﬀort is expended. Her
wage also depends on the current distribution of knowledge within the
1This model can be incorporated into a general equilibrium model, as in Mitchell
(1998), where the demand for the industry’s good is unaﬀected by income and the
wages paid outside the industry are constant.
4industry. This helps to focus attention on the wage diﬀerentials between
diﬀerent firms instead of a matching problem that would arise. The re-
sults would not change significantly if researchers’ output was dependent
on their level of know-how and technology. A researcher who works for
a firm with a higher θ will receive a higher payoﬀ from having imitated
its θ than a researcher who works for a firm with a lower θ and imitated
her employer’s θ. This diﬀerence is accounted for in the diﬀerent wages.
We can also compare wages across ﬁrms using diﬀerent technologies.
The firm’s choice variables are given by the vector (q,l), where q is
the quantity produced and l is the innovative eﬀort, given by the measure
of researchers hired in each period. The firm’s net revenue is given by
p(n,ν)q −c(q,θ,n)−lw(θ,n,l,ν)
The price of the good produced by the industry, in equilibrium, is deter-
mined by the distribution of knowledge in the industry since the industry
is perfectly competitive and the good is homogeneous across all firms.






limq→∞ c￿ (q,n,θ)=∞ , ∀ θ∈Θ
dc(q,n,θ)
dθ < 0
c(q,n,θ) >c( q,n+1 ,θ), ∀n
Note that the costs are decomposed into the cost associated with pro-
duction of the good and that associated with innovation.
The transition function of the firm’s knowledge and technology is
given by a cumulative distribution function Ψ(θ
￿,n ￿|θ,n,l) that measures
the probability of obtaining future know-how θ
￿ about technology n￿
given current know-how θ about technology n and labor l. Note that it
is not dependent on the cross distribution of agents, ν, since the firm’s
subsequent know-how is dependent on the firm’s innovative eﬀort, which
is represented by how many researchers it hires or l, and its current
knowledge, and not on the state of the industry. The properties of Ψ are
(i) Innovation is not guaranteed. (Ψ(θ,n|θ,n,l) > 0)
(ii) Innovation is costly. (Ψ(θ,n|θ,n,0) = 1)
5(iii) There is no forgetting. (Ψ(θ
￿,n￿|θ,n,l)=0if θ
￿ <θor n￿ <n . )
(iv) Increasing eﬀort and know-how improves prospects. (If ￿ θ ≥
θ and ￿ l ≥ l, then Ψ(θ
￿,n￿|￿ θ,n,￿ l) first order stochastically dominates
Ψ(θ
￿,n ￿|θ,n,l).)
(v) Learning is concave in researchers. (For any two learning expen-
ditures, l1 and l2,a n da∈[0,1], Ψ(θ
￿,n ￿|θ,n,al1 +( 1−a ) l 2)dominates
aΨ(θ
￿,n ￿|θ,n,l1)+( 1−α )Ψ(θ
￿,n ￿|θ,n,l2) in the first order stochastic
sense.)








The first four assumptions are similar to those used in Jovanovic and
MacDonald (1994), but the imitative possibilities are suppressed. This
isolates the mechanism through which imitation occurs: imitation occurs
only through researchers who work for firms in the industry. Assumption
(v) helps to guarantee that firms with the same know-how about a given
technology will choose to expend the same eﬀort given the same distri-
bution of know-how, instead of randomizing between diﬀerent levels of
eﬀort.
So, imitation between existing firms is not allowed in this model. This
is done to isolate the imitative eﬀects: imitation occurs only through
researchers who work within the industry. Firms can only learn by inno-
vative eﬀort through hiring researchers. Recall that researchers supply
a homogeneous product to the firms. Any increase in the technology
and know-how pair is based on the firm’s innovative eﬀort, its previous
technology and know-how pair and the stochastic innovative shock.
Before the complete agent’s problem is presented, the law of motion
for the distribution of knowledge is presented and the timing of the model
is made clear.
1.1.1 The Law of Motion
The law of motion depends on the actions of the agents in the economy.
Recall that the knowledge of the agents who work outside the industry
is unchanged. So, the distribution will be unaﬀected by their actions.
In the case of agents who work as researchers within the industry, the
distribution will be unaﬀected by 1−λ−
￿
dΨ(θ
￿,n ￿ >n| l,θ,n) of them,
who fail to learn their employers’ technology and knowledge pair, while




￿,n ￿ >n| l,θ,n) of these agents will learn a completely
new technology n￿. Finally, the plant owners will eﬀect the distribution
given their choice of innovative eﬀort.
The law of motion is written formally using the following three sub-
sets. Which agents are members of the subsets is determined by their
6actions. Let νP be the measure of agents who become firm owners, νR,
the measure of agents who work as researchers within the industry and
νW, the measure of agents who work outside the industry. We can fur-
ther partition by technology n used. Let νnP be the measure of ﬁrms
using technology n. Without loss of generality, each firm is assumed
to hire only one type of researcher. So, all researchers at a particular
firm will have the same level of technology and know-how. In order to
keep account of how many agents are hired by which firms and both the
firms’ and the agents’ type, the function z is used.z( l,(n,θr),(m,θf))
is the measure of firms with (m,θf) that hire l units of researchers with
(n,θr) and has the following characteristics:
￿
L×(I,Θ)z(dl × d(n,θr) × (m,θf)) = νmP (θf)
￿
L×(I,Θ)lz( dl ×(n,θr) ×d(m,θf)) = νnR (θr)
￿
L×(I,Θ)×(I,Θ)z(dl × d(n,θr) × d(m,θf)) = νP (Θ)
￿
L×(I,Θ)×(I,Θ)lz( dl × d(n,θr) × d(m,θf)) = νR (Θ)
Note that ν (n,θ) is the fraction of agents with the pair (n,θ). So,
νnP (θf) is the measure of plant owners with (n,θf) and νnR (θr) is the
measure of researchers with (n,θr). Recall that Θ is the set [θL,θ H]and
I is the set of all possible technologies.
For any set A ⊂ Θ,
Φ(νn)(A)=ν nW (A)
+(1 − λ −
￿
dΨ(θ
￿,m ￿ >m| l,θ,m ≥ n))
￿￿




L×(m≤n,A)×[(n,Θ)]lz (dl ×d(m,θr) ×d(n,θf))
+
￿






Ψ(A,n|l,θ,m < n)dνm<nP (Θ), for ∀ V (A,n,Φ) >V( θ f,m,Φ)
￿
The first branch represents the measure of agents who worked outside the
industry and whose know-how was an element of the set A. Recall that
7the knowledge of these agents is unchanged. The second branch simply
represents those agents who worked as researchers at firms and failed to
learn their employer’s technology and had technology n and knowledge
t h a tw a sa ne l e m e n to fs e tA . The third branch is the measure of agents
who worked as researchers for firms with technology n and knowledge
in the set A who learned their employer’s technology and knowledge
pair. The fourth branch is the measure of agents who were researchers
for ﬁrms with technology that was lower than n and developed a new
technology n. The penultimate branch is those ﬁrms with technology
n who knowledge about that technology was in the set A at the end of
the period. This could be a result of either innovative eﬀort or because
their knowledge remained unchanged. The final branch is the measure
of those incorporated agents whose technology was less than n and who
innovated and developed technology n and knowledge that was within
the set A.
1.2 The Agent’s Complete Problem
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(1)
where β is the discount factor and V (θ,ν) is the value function. The
first branch considers the lifetime income of taking a job outside the
8industry. Note that in this case the agent’s knowledge doesn’t change in
the following period. The second is the return to choosing to become a
researcher in the industry. In this case, the agent’s future technology and
knowledge pair becomes either the same as her employer with probability
λ, or she learns a new technology if the ﬁrm develops one. Otherwise,
her technology and knowledge pair remains unchanged. The last part
defines the return for becoming an incorporated agent. Here the agent’s
future technology and knowledge pair, θ
￿, is determined by the transition
function Ψ.
1.3 Equilibrium
In Franco and Filson (1999), a model was developed and its implications
were compared with data from the hard drive industry. It was shown
that the model developed there was well-suited to ﬁt the data and pro-
vided reasonable explanations for some of the unexplained facts about
the hard drive industry. The above model builds on that one in several
ways. As in Franco and Filson, agents must learn how to increase their
productivity. Further, the productivity of the industry improves over
time as agents learn. The main diﬀerence is that here agents must chose
between diﬀerent technologies and associated productivities. This dif-
ference is captured in the law of motion, which is used in the deﬁnition
of equilibrium given below.
Deﬁnition 1 An industry equilibrium is given by a sequence of prices,
{pnt(ν)}
∞
t=0 , wages, {wt (θ,n,l)}
∞
t=0, actions, {qt,l t,νnWt,νnRt,νnPt,z t}
∞
t=0 ,
and a distribution, {νt}
∞






2. The distribution νnt is consistent with optimization for all t
3. zn (n,θ,l) is described by the maximizers defined by equation (1)
4.
￿




In equilibrium, agents optimize. The price of the products produced
by the industry is set equal to the inverse industry demand given the
distribution of know-how. The next period’s distribution of know-how
and technology in the continuum is determined by which firms in the
industry innovated in the current period in addition to which researchers
imitated their employers knowledge and/or technology, given that these
9agents are acting optimally. Supply of labor for a particular firm is set
equal to labor demanded by the wage and the supply of firms is equal
to the demand for firms.
This equilibrium is a special case of the one presented in Jovanovic
and Rosenthal (1988). Since there is no aggregate uncertainty and the
suﬀicient conditions for such equilibrium to exist are satisfied, this equi-
librium exists.
2W age Structure, Evolution of Knowledge and Prices
First, consider the wages paid to an agent who works as a researcher.
This agent faces a trade-oﬀ between wages and future value of knowledge.
This trade-oﬀ is discussed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For any two ﬁrms i and j, using the same technology,
n, with know-how θi and θj, respectively, which hire l>0of researchers
with the same level of technology and know-how, (m,θr), such that either















￿,n ￿ >n | θ j,n,l)
￿
Proof. Recall all researchers produce a homogeneous product, in-
novative eﬀort. Consider a researcher p with knowledge θp of m tech-
nology, working at an arbitrary ﬁrm i with technology and know-how
(n,θi), where either m<nor if m = n, θi ≥ θp. The worker’s return












￿,n ￿ >n| l,θi,n))V (θp,m,Φ(ν))


In order for worker p to be weakly indiﬀerent between working for ﬁrm i,
and any arbitrary ﬁrm j in the industry with technology and know-how
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dΨ(θ
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￿,n ￿ >n| l,θj,n))V (θp,m,Φ(ν))


















￿,n ￿ >n | θ j,n,l)
￿
Next, consider the case of a researcher q, working at an arbitrary ﬁrm
j with (θj,n)where θj ≥ θq if n = m. Like researcher p, the following
condition must be satisﬁed for him to be weakly indiﬀerent between






















￿,n ￿ >n | θ i,n,l)
+(1 − λ −
￿
dΨ(θ
￿,n ￿ >n| l,θi,n))V (θq,m,Φ(ν))

 ∀i ￿= j
















￿,n ￿ >n | θ i,n,l)
￿
Recall that by assumption, both of these researchers have the same
knowledge. By replacing θp and θq with θr, these two conditions im-
ply Proposition 1, since both i and j are arbitrary.￿
This proposition shows that agents who work for a ﬁrm with a more
know-how about a given technology will accept a lower wage. This is
a result of the fact that imitation is site speciﬁc. Both the researchers
and the ﬁrms know that only the researchers will be able to imitate
either the current know-how and technology pair used by the employer
or its new technology. Next, we can describe the wage diﬀerentials paid
by ﬁrms using diﬀerent technologies. Here, the agents who work as
researchers determine the trade-oﬀ between the possibility of imitating
a more productive technology or imitating a newly developed technology.
Proposition 3 Corollary 4 For any two ﬁrms i and j, with (θf,n i)
and (θf,n j), respectively, where ni >n j which hire l>0the same type
of researchers with knowledge θr about technology n, such that either
11nj >n ,o rθ f>θ r,



















￿,n ￿ >n | θ f,n j,l)


Proof. The proof follows from the above proposition. First, we
consider a researcher p with technology and know-how (θp,n), working
at an arbitrary ﬁrm i with technology and know-how (θi,n i), where









￿,n￿ >n i| θ f,n,l)
+(1 − λ −
￿
dΨ(θ
￿,n ￿ >n| l,θf,n i))V (θp,n,Φ(ν))


In order for worker p to be weakly indiﬀerent between working for ﬁrm i,
and any arbitrary ﬁrm j in the industry with technology and know-how
(nj,θ j), the following must hold.
w (θp,n,θ f,n i,l)+β
￿




￿,n ￿ >n i| θ f,n i,l)
￿
≥
w(θ p,n,θ j,n j,l)+β
￿




￿,n ￿ >n j| θ j,n j,l)
￿
Next, consider the case of a researcher q, working at an arbitrary ﬁrm
j with (θf,n j) where either θf >θ q ,o rn j >nand ni >n j . Like
researcher p, the following condition must be satisﬁed for him to be
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dΨ(θ










￿,n ￿ >n i| θ f,n i,l)
+(1 − λ −
￿
dΨ(θ
￿,n ￿ >n i| l,θf,n i))V (θq,n,Φ(ν))

 ∀i ￿= j
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￿
12Recall that by assumption, both of these researchers have the same
knowledge. By replacing θp and θq with θr, these two conditions im-
ply Proposition 1, since both i and j are arbitrary.￿
Here, the main diﬀerence is that the ﬁrms are using diﬀerent tech-
nologies. Instead of the trade-oﬀ in wage paid by two ﬁrms with diﬀer-
ent know-how about the same technology, the agent faces a trade-oﬀ in
wages by working as a researcher for a ﬁrm with a higher level of technol-
ogy than another ﬁrm. The wages paid by a ﬁrm with a higher level of
technology are lower than that paid by a ﬁrm with the lower technology.
The structure of the wages paid by ﬁrms using one technology is highly
structured. This is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 The wage paid by any ﬁrm with technology n is non-decreasing
in θf.
Because the cost function is decreasing in θ, regardless of the level of
technology used, the following is obvious.
Lemma 6 The value function is non-decreasing in θ.
Next, we can consider the evolution of the technologies used in the
industry. Here, as technologies are developed, agents must choose to
either use them in the future or continue using the older technology
which is more productive. Firms who develop new technologies will face
a trade-oﬀ between higher productivity with older technologies and lower
productivity with newer technologies. Some will ﬁnd that “sticking”
with the older technologies is more proﬁtable, but will, over time,. have
to become either more productive with the older technology or develop
an even newer technology.
Proposition 7 Given ν0, the equilibrium sequence, {νt}, converges to
a distribution, ν∗.
Proof. There exists a monotone sequence of distribution functions
underlying {νt} called Ft with the following property for some (θL,1)
and (θH,I)
F t(θ L,1 )=0and Ft(θH,I)=1 ,for t =1 ,2 ,....., and
By Corollary 2 to Theorem 12.9, (Helly’s Theorem) in Stokey, Lucas,
Prescott (1989), there exists a distribution function F with
F(θL,1) = 0 and F(θH,I)=1
and {Ft} converges weakly to F.￿
Proposition 2 introduces a distribution, ν∗, under which no learning
occurs. Once ν∗ is reached, no ﬁrms have any incentives to invest in
innovation, since its costs outweighs the returns. This distribution, ν∗,
depends on the initial distribution.
133 Data
New diameters were introduced in 1979, 1980, 1983, 1988 and 1991. The
ﬁrst was an ´ 8” diameter which was introduced by International Mem-
ories, a spin-out of Memorex. International Memories was founded in
1977 and exited the hard drive industry in 1985. The second new diam-
eter was a 5.25” which was introduced by Seagate, which was founded in
1979 and remained active in 1997. Seagate was spin-out of Shugart Asso-
ciates. In 1983, Control Data introduced a 3.5” diameter. Control Data
is the only ﬁrm to have introduced a new diameter in this period that
was not a spin-out. The 2.5” diameter was introduced by PriarieTek,
which was a spin-out of Miniscribe and was in the hard drive industry
from 1986 to 1991. The last diameter introduced in this period was in-
troduced by Integral Peripherals which was a spin-out of PriarieTek. It
was founded in 1990 and remained active in 1997. Given this history, the
periods of particular interest are 1978-1980, 1979-1981, 1987-1989, and
1990-1992, since the diameter introduced in 1983 was not introduced by
a spin-out. However, it would be interesting to use that period to help
determine why an incumbent ﬁrm was able to introduce a new diameter.
The main data source for the product features and ﬁrm genealogy is
the Disk/Trend Report on Rigid Disk Drives (Porter (1977-1997)). The
reports cover the period 1977-1997, and include detailed product char-
acteristics of the drives produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms each year, the dates
that the drives were introduced, and the date the ﬁrm was founded. For
new ﬁrms, information about the background of the founders is pro-
vided. For all ﬁrms, historical information and recent news is summa-
rized. To determine spin-out-parent relationships, the histories from the
Disk/Trend Report were supplemented with company press releases and
articles provided by James Porter, the editor of the Disk/Trend Report,
along with the Directory of Corporate Aﬃliations, the International Di-
rectory of Company Histories, and a study by Christensen (1993). The
other data needed is information on product prices and quantities sold
for the particular years of interest. The price and quantity data is not
available for the earlier years, but is available more consisently for the
last two periods. This is available from International Data Corporation.
By structurally estimating this model, we can estimate the standard
errors of interest. In particular, we can consider if the two diameters
of hard drives were complements or substitutes. This may have some
bearing on the lock-in eﬀect. It could be the case that if the goods
are complements, the lock-in eﬀect is stronger than if they are substi-
tutes. One advantage of this model is that the competitive equilibrium
is pareto optimal. This allows us to use the Planner’s problem, which
will minimize the computation time.
144 Summary
The research described here proposes to study and quantify the lock-in
eﬀect experienced by ﬁrms in high-tech industries, and in particular, the
hard drive industry. There is strong evidence that there is a lock-in eﬀect,
since most of the new products have been introduced by entering ﬁrms
even though these products were developed by incumbent ﬁrms. There
is also strong evidence that a competitive ﬁrms model is appropriate, as
a result of the study in Franco and Filson (1999).
This model is builds on several of the results of Jovanovic and Nyarko
(1996) which suggest one reason why leaders may tend to be slow to
adopt new technologies: an opportunity cost of switching. Even though,
there are incremental improvements in productivity for any given tech-
nology, these may be outweighed by the beneﬁts of new technologies, in
the long run. However, agents who switch to a new technology may not
be as eﬀective in operating it as in operating the old technology. Since
the switch is costly because of this loss of expertise, an agent may choose
to forestall switching technologies.
Here, the main focus is on radical changes in technology. Christensen
(1997) discusses the some of the diﬀerences created by radical changes
in technology in the hard drive industry. He suggests that these changes
are signiﬁcantly more important in understanding the dynamics of the
hard drive industry. This paper will help to document these eﬀects and
their magnitudes.
The evolution of the technologies and knowledge of the industry will
evolve given the optimal choices by agents and can be completely char-
acterized given initial conditions. I will consider whether leaders in this
model will be unwilling to adopt new technologies in order to avoid
paying switching costs. Using data from the hard drive industry, I can
parameterize this model to test whether the issues posed in Jovanovic
and Nyarko are quantitatively important as well as being qualitatively
important.
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